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Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft in Cooperatives 
 
Abstract A cooperative business consists of a cooperative society and a cooperative 
business firm. The society of members intends to control the business in such a way as to 
focus the business operations on its interests. The two organizational units tend, however, 
to follow different behavioral logics. Borrowing some core concepts from classical 
sociology, Gemeinschaft norms rule ruling within the membership, while Gesellschaft 
norms dominate the business firms. Thereby it may be difficult to accomplish alignment 
between the membership organization and the business organization in order to be 
competitive. This paper addresses the difficulties of following the different logics by 
exploring Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft within agricultural cooperatives with a focus on 
the membership logics.  
 
Keywords: Cooperative, Membership, Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft, Alignment 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
A cooperative is a dual organization. It consists of a cooperative society and a business 
firm. The society, hierarchically organized with a board on top, owns and controls the 
firm. The firm exists in order to satisfy the desires of the cooperative society’s members. 
Hence the two units are closely interlinked and mutually dependent upon each other. 
 
At the same time the two organizational units may be quite different. The business firm 
operates on market conditions; hence it has to be as efficient as competing firms. The 
society has members who are not only businessmen, for example farmers, but also 
humans, which means that the society has social attributes. The interrelationships 
between the various members of the cooperative society and therefore also between the 
members and the society at large are often characterized in terms of trust, involvement, 
commitment, solidarity, loyalty and similar socio-psychological constructs. The literature 
on cooperatives abounds with treatments about cooperative ideology where also the 
concept of a specific cooperative value set is found (Hakelius 1996; Hogeland 2006).  
 
This difference between cooperative societies and cooperative firms implies that there 
might be different behavioral logics behind the activities within the two types of units. If 
so there is either a risk for poor alignment between the two or that the alignment that 
takes place is on the conditions of one organizational unit at the expense of the other one. 
In any case there is a risk for inefficient operations. This may be detrimental as the two 
organizational units are like the two sides of the same coin . If the cooperative society is 
dominated by the business firm, there is a risk for members becoming uncommitted and 
losing their trust in the cooperative, and therefore the members reduce their trade, do not 
want to invest in the cooperative and refrain from controlling the firm. Similarly, if the 
cooperative society forces the firm to adapt to its own demands only, there is a risk that 
the firm does not become competitive enough.  
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While an investor-owned firm (IOF) has to consider only the business logics, a 
cooperative firm’s success is contingent on the interplay between both logics, i.e. also the 
social attributes of the cooperative society. Hence King (1995, p 1160 & p 1161) states 
that  
 
… efficiency considerations alone cannot be the basis for institutional design, especially in a 
setting of high transaction costs and increasing concentration of market power. … [T]he primary 
strength of cooperatives has been in providing the infrastructure and service support systems 
needed to deliver and implement more technologies … 
 
It may be that the problems that many agricultural cooperatives have been facing recently 
and currently face are rooted in the difficulties to unite the logics of cooperative societies 
and business firms. Some cooperatives have transformed into another cooperative 
organizational model, for example by introducing individual ownership by the members 
(Nilsson and Ohlsson 2007) or by restructuring their internal organization (Bijman 
Hendrikse and Van Oijen 2007). Others have disappeared due to mergers or acquisitions 
(Chaddad and Cook 2004; Van der Krogt, Nilsson and Høst 2007). Some bankruptcies 
have taken place (Lang 2006). Other cooperatives have sold a part of their business 
activities to investors, thus getting a hybrid type of cooperative (van Bekkum and Bijman 
2006). Still others have converted into investor-owned firms.  
 
The above-mentioned development may be explained with the help of property rights 
theory in line with Furubotn and Pejovich (1972). As a cooperative expands in order to be 
competitive, there will be increasing information asymmetry between the members and 
the professional management. Therefore the members will experience difficulties in 
monitoring the firm, and the management will control the residual rights. The commercial 
logics of running a large and complex business firm and the social logics within the 
membership are not aligned.  
 
The various organizational models may be expressed as different governance structures, 
i.e. different constellations of control rights and income rights (Hendrikse 2005). They 
vary for example depending on whether producer interests or capital interests guide the 
decision making and whether the decision making is centralized or decentralized. Hence, 
also the logics within the member organization versus within the cooperative business 
firm are embraced by the governance structures. Nevertheless, the question of what is 
included in the member interests, or the membership logics, is unresolved – what kind of 
logic exists as the members and the member organization evaluate the cooperative 
business? Hence with a well balanced governance structure, i.e. one that gives high-
powered incentives to the members to monitor the firm, even large and complex 
cooperatives may thrive (Baron 2007).  
 
This paper addresses the logics within the memberships of agricultural cooperatives. The 
aim of the study is to explore the logics that may be found within cooperative 
memberships, especially pinpointing the problems that might result in terms of poor 
alignment with the logics within the cooperative business firms.  
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The classification of logics used here is borrowed from classical sociology (Tönnies 
1957). Gemeinschaft expresses human relationships characterized by closeness, kinship 
and friendship. Gesellschaft is a type of interaction that humans have with anonymous 
others. It is evident that these two logics vary considerably because agricultural 
cooperatives are very different from one another. They are found in different industries, 
different countries and cultures, and different time periods. For this sake the empirical 
basis for this study comprises several agricultural industries and different countries. Still, 
the findings can only be indicative.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reports from six empirical studies within 
cooperative memberships, all indicating that the social forces are strong. The cases cover 
several countries and several agricultural industries. Following this is an account of a 
classical approach to explain different types of human interaction (or logics), for example 
the processes within the cooperative society and within the cooperative business firm. 
The subsequent section 4 is an analysis of the six empirical studies in light of the 
different logics of human interaction. Some conclusions for future research on 
cooperatives are drawn.  
 
 
2 Case studies 
 
2.1 Member motive variety 
 
Member behavior in agricultural cooperatives has been subject to research in a large 
number of empirical studies. These studies report about farmers’ motivational factors, 
attitudes, choice of business partners, and other behavioral constructs. In general these 
studies reveal that member behavior is complex and difficult to forecast.  
 
A selection of studies is presented here. The choice of studies is based on a few 
conditions. First, they should be recent. Second, they should present a variety of member 
behavior, i.e. different agricultural industries and different countries. Hence the six 
studies represent cooperatives in five countries, operating in five agricultural industries. 
All of them present the social forces within the membership – how members look upon 
the cooperatives as trading partners and their willingness to be involved in the 
cooperatives.  
 
Swedish forest owners 
 
In a study of Swedish forest owners’ choice between cooperative and investor-owned 
business partners Enander, Melin and Nilsson (2009) found that the forest owners often 
base themselves on personal relations to the representatives of the buying firms. Because 
the ownership of forest land represents substantial amounts of capital, the forest owners 
should reasonably be keen to get the highest possible price for their timber. It should be 
noted that forestry is regarded as an agricultural industry as a large share of Sweden’s 
forest land is owned by farmers.  
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One possible explanation for the forest owners’ behavior is that the calculation of prices 
is a complicated matter because no two trees are identical. Likewise, the forestry 
cooperatives and the investor-owned processors apply different pricing principles, 
whereby the forest owners have difficulties in comparing the prices. Moreover, while the 
investor-owned processors pay a flat price, the major cooperative also pays patronage 
refunds, a dividend that is difficult to know beforehand, as well as bonus shares.  
 
Some forest owners even regard the buying firms’ representatives as personal friends 
even though they must reasonably understand that these persons’ interests are directly 
opposite to their own interests. A possible reason may be that conducting forestry 
operations involves considerable complexities for many owners so they are in need of 
assistance and advice.  
 
An outside observer would believe that the forest owners, due to the difficulties in 
assessing the two optional buyer categories, would discuss with each other in order to 
obtain information. That is, however, not the case. On the contrary the forest owners 
hardly ever exchange experiences about different business partners. This is a sensitive 
issue and they do not want to jeopardize their relations with other forest owners.  
 
If the forest owners are not affected by other forest owners’ choice of business partners 
they are the more influenced by traditions. A large share of the respondents said that they 
have the same partner firm as their parents had. The business partners are inherited from 
one generation to the next.  
 
All in all, the forest owners’ behavior seems to be loaded with sentiments – about 
cooperative versus non-cooperative partners, relationships to the processing firms’ 
representatives, relationships to neighboring forest owners, relationships to family, etc. 
When planning its operations the forestry cooperative has to take these behavioral traits 
into account and likewise in its running of the member organization and in all other 
exchange with the members.  
 
Macedonian dairy farmers 
 
Krstevska and Nilsson (2009) report about Macedonian dairy farmers’ relationships with 
different types of buying firms. Diary farms in Macedonia are divided into small and 
large farms. The small farms have only a few cows while the large farms may have 
twenty or more cows. The large farmers’ behavior resembles that of dairy farmers in 
Western Europe. The processors have cool tanker trucks, which collect the milk at the 
farms every second day.  
 
The small dairy farmers are different. Their handling of the milk is purely manual and 
they have no cooling equipment. Even though they deliver the milk to special collection 
stations in the villages twice per day, the quality of the milk becomes poor (contaminated 
by bacteria, high amount of cells, low on protein, etc.). This milk can not be delivered to 
a firm that processes the raw product to any value-added products. If this were to happen, 
the price would be extremely low. Instead the milk is sold to small processors in the 
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villages where it is mainly made into yoghurt. These small dairies pay a fixed per liter 
price because they have no equipment for measuring quality.  
 
There are social connections between the smallholders so they generally inform each 
other about everything they do. There are, however, also strong links between the 
smallholders and the yoghurt producers in the villages. These links contribute to preserve 
the trading pattern. Hence, no development takes place. Alternatively the dairy farmers 
(small as well as large) could have established a cooperative firm which would advice 
them about how to get better milk quality and to market the milk at a higher price. Such 
cooperatives are, however, not established since the farmers have little trust in one 
another and they also lack both capital to invest in a cooperative and skills to organize it.  
 
In conclusion, the small dairy farmers are to a large extent driven by social forces, which 
contribute to preserve status quo, preventing the formation of a cooperative and the 
improvement of milk quality and the search for alternative processing firms.  
 
Russian agricultural producers 
 
Another study that concerns farmers’ disinterest in cooperative organizations treats 
Russian experiences (Golovina and Nilsson 2009). Because the agricultural producers 
have no tradition of cooperative business the Russian government has instituted a number 
of marketing and supply cooperatives. A survey among the agricultural producers shows 
that these top-down organized cooperatives have meager survival chances.  
 
The population of agricultural producers is extremely heterogeneous, comprising both 
former kolzhoses and sovzhoses (with a few thousand hectares) and household farmers 
(with about one hectare on average). Hence the degree of trust within the memberships is 
extremely small. The cooperatives that the governmental authorities have established are 
about to fade away as the equity capital is being lost. The chairman of the board is often 
one of the very large agricultural producers, and he has not the ability to unite the very 
heterogeneous membership – on the contrary his interest is to promote his own interests.  
 
Members of a Swedish farm supply and grain marketing cooperative 
 
The board of directors of Sweden’s largest agricultural cooperative faced problems as the 
members raised complaints about poor prices both when they bought farm inputs from 
the cooperative and when they sold grain to it (Nilsson, Kihlén and Norell 2009). As a 
result the board launched a budget-cutting program, leading to the demise of the retail 
chain and the decrease in the number of silos. Moreover, the member organization was 
remodeled. The number of local wards was reduced and larger wards were created. The 
number of echelons in the organizational hierarchy was reduced and the number of 
elected representatives became fewer. Through these measures the cooperative succeeded 
to cut one-tenth of its total costs whereby it could improve the prices offered to the 
members.  
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This cost cutting process was, however, not positively received by the members. Both the 
silo plants and the retail outlets were the members’ local connections to the cooperative. 
These plants had “always” existed and were important to preserve a living countryside, 
according to the members. The new member organization was considered to weaken the 
members’ connection to each other and to the cooperative. A survey showed that the 
members had low trust in the cooperatives’ leadership, and their commitment was low. 
Hence, the social forces within the membership and the economic interests of the 
members were contradictory.  
 
Contributing to the low member commitment is the fact that this cooperative follows a 
specific governance structure. One-fourth of the cooperative’s turnover is trade with the 
members – the rest is upstream and downstream activities with no connection to the 
farmers, also internationally. The cooperative has operations in 19 countries. The non-
member related business operations are run as a profit-maximizing business. Thanks to 
the profits of these downstream and upstream operations the members get extremely good 
return on the investments in the cooperative. Nevertheless they feel that the non-member 
related operations dominate the cooperative to the extent that their interests are no longer 
taken into account.  
 
New Zealand dairy farmers 
 
In 2007 the board of Fonterra, one of the world’s largest dairy cooperatives, proposed 
that the cooperative should be partly demutualized. In order to be able to exploit market 
opportunities the cooperative needed more capital, and the Stock Exchange was 
considered to be the best capital source (Rydberg 2009). Most members were, however, 
opposed to this remodeling plan. There is a strong cooperative tradition in New Zealand. 
For most dairy farmers Fonterra is the only possible milk buyer. Hence, an opposition’ 
was seen within the membership, and the board withdrew its proposal.  
 
Contributing to this development is the fact that Fonterra has a “shadow board”, 
Shareholders’ Council, which worked against the proposal of the board. The 
Shareholders’ Council enjoys the members’ confidence much more than the Board. It 
was meant to be a “watch dog” when Fonterra was established as this cooperative would 
be extremely dominating in the New Zealand dairy industry.  
 
2.2 Alignment of member society and business firm motives 
 
Many studies report about similar social driving forces among cooperative members (e.g. 
Jensen 1990; Hansen, Morrow and Batista 2002; Bhuyan 2007; James and Sykuta 2006; 
Österberg and Nilsson 2009). Some state that various economic factors are important for 
member commitment, loyalty, and other expressions of satisfaction (Fulton and 
Adamowicz 1993; Gray and Kraenzle 1998). However, others state that the cooperatives’ 
service level as well as the cooperatives’ ability to offer an assured market is just as 
important as the price levels (Burt and Wirth 1990; Misra, Carley and Fletcher 1993), or 
sometimes even more important (Bravo-Ureta and Lee 1988; Cain, Toensmeyer and 
Ramsey 1989; Jensen 1990; Klein, Richards and Walburger 1997). 
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Borgen (2001) conducted a study among members of Norwegian cooperatives. The 
farmers have a psychological attachment to their cooperatives. Their membership even 
contributes to providing “self-identification”. In an investigation, covering Swedish 
members of agricultural cooperative within different industries Fahlbeck (2007) found 
that there is a preference for unallocated (collectively owned) capital. This may be 
interpreted as the members feeling like a collective.  
 
Laursen (2005) found regarding different Danish cooperatives that the farmers were 
generally satisfied with the cooperatives, even though these are of very large size. The 
largest agricultural cooperatives in Denmark seem to have succeeded in preserving strong 
member satisfaction even though they are working on world market conditions.  
 
 
3 Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
 
The empirical observations presented in section 2 may be analyzed in terms of 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. These two concepts originate from classical sociological 
theory, coined by the German pioneering sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies in 1887. The 
concepts have been translated into English as “community” and “society” (Tönnies 1957) 
but these terms do not cover the original German terms very well so Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft are most often used also in English language texts.  
 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are ideal type concepts. They may very well exist in their 
extreme form in real life but there is also a host of intermediary forms.  
 
3.1 Gemeinschaft 
 
Gemeinschaft implies interaction between humans who know each other more or less 
and, above all, who care for each other. Hence it most often concerns interaction within 
relatively small groups. It is typical that the group of founders of a cooperative society 
consists of a few individuals who are well acquainted, and thus have trust in each other. It 
is, however, not necessary that Gemeinschaft occurs only in small groups. The number of 
individuals could even be quite large, for example within a social class, where a specific 
class consciousness exists. Therefore, one may find Gemeinschaft also in large 
cooperative memberships as well as in churches and social classes.  
 
Within a Gemeinschaft, the motivation is the individuals’ Wesenwille, which has been 
translated into “essential will”. The Gemeinschaft members are members of the group 
because the membership is self-evident to them. The driving force is hence almost 
instinctive and organic. The membership gives satisfaction in itself and is thus self-
fulfilling. To the extent that a member of a Gemeinschaft does no longer find his or her 
membership satisfactory, he or she will leave the group, and vice versa. Because of this 
Gemeinschaft groups tend to be homogeneous in respects that are important to the 
members.  
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Tönnies identified two types of Gemeinschaft. One is cooperatives (Genossenschaft), 
which implies community between all participating actors on an equal basis. The other 
subgroup is authority (Herrschaft), which implies that there are natural or elected leaders 
within the group, for example priests within a religious community. It seems that Tönnies 
had sympathies for the cooperative category as the entire book has been seen as an 
expression of his worries about the increasing dominance of Gesellschaft formations in 
Germany of his time, and he hoped that the growing consumer cooperative movement 
was a promising development.  
 
3.2 Gesellschaft 
 
Gesellschaft concerns human interaction when the actors are unknown and anonymous to 
one another. Gesellschaft interaction is more likely to occur within large groups of 
individuals. Hence it may characterize the interaction within large cooperative 
memberships, including the members’ attitudes towards the cooperative society and the 
cooperative firm. Just as the case is with Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft is found in both 
large and small groups of individuals. It occurs, for example, when an individual buyer 
and an individual seller are negotiating with each other.  
 
The driving force behind Gesellschaft was called Kürwille by Tönnies, or “conditional 
will” or “arbitrary will”. It implies that the individual exhibits a calculative behavior. An 
individual who acts according to Kürwille separates means from ends and is thus able to 
choose efficient means to reach his or her goals. Hence, the behavior is future directed, 
purposive and instrumental.  
 
3.3 From Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft 
 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are opposing each other. An individual who acts 
according to Wesenwille in a Gesellschaft setting will have problems, and vice versa. For 
this reason the balance between the two modes of interaction determines the degree of 
success of an individual or organization may get. An actor must know the balance 
between the two interaction types and act accordingly, or the actor must choose a setting 
that is suitable for a specific way of acting.  
 
The problems of conflicting Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are aggravated as the two are 
often organizationally related to each other and thus they affect each other. This is the 
case of cooperative organizations, comprising both a cooperative society and a 
cooperative business firm. Tönnies devoted much thought to a similar relationship, 
namely that between the people and the state.  
 
Many researchers, including Tönnies himself, state that the balance between the two 
types of human interaction is successively changing. Gesellschaft is constantly gaining 
ground on behalf of Gemeinschaft. This pattern could, however, not be the entire truth as 
that would imply that over the years all human interaction would be of the Gesellschaft 
type.  
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The solution to this apparent paradox must reasonably be that new Gemeinschaft 
organizations are being established all the time, but these new establishments are so small 
that they are hardly visible to observers. Gemeinschaft organizations, which are 
successful, tend to grow whereby they take on more and more Gesellschaft attributes. For 
example, it is a widespread observation that cooperatives, in order to be competitive, 
expand and merge, and so the membership organizations become large and get 
bureaucracy attributes. In several Western European countries there is a wave of small 
newly established cooperatives as a reaction to the continuing growth of the large 
cooperatives. “Countervailing powers” are in operation. These newly established and 
small cooperatives are generally characterized by substantial Gemeinschaft.  
 
The difficulties in preserving Gemeinschaft are the core of Michels’ study of the German 
social democratic movement (Michels 1968 [1911]). As the Party expanded, the 
organization could no longer preserve its democratic ideals. Instead a small elitist group 
will grasp the control. Michels considered this to be an inevitable development in all 
democratic popular movements, and so he coined the concept “the Iron Law of 
Oligarchy”. Michels’ study has often been cited by critics of cooperative organizations.  
 
A similar development is reported by Stryjan (1989) when he investigated the 
development of the Israeli kibbutzim. For this form of cooperative organization to 
survive, a constant “reproduction of the membership” is necessary, otherwise the 
Gesellschaft attributes will squeeze out the Gemeinschaft attributes. The kibbutzim are 
successively losing ground.  
 
 
4 Analysis 
 
The six studies presented above are here subject to interpretation in terms of the 
Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft taxonomy. All the studies indicate that members of 
cooperative societies do not always behave in accordance with the assumptions of homo 
oeconomicus. They are rather homo sociologicus even though the border line between 
these two conceptions of human behavior is often diffuse.  
 
The Russian agricultural producers would benefit from cooperative organizations, and so 
would the Macedonian smallholders in the dairy industry. If these actors were to behave 
rationally – in line with Gesellschaft norms – they could perhaps establish some 
cooperatives. The fact that the level of trust between the farmers is low prevents them 
from taking any initiative in the direction of cooperative formation. To the extent that the 
Russian agricultural producers and the Macedonian smallholders have good reasons for 
their distrust in other producers their behavior does not express Gemeinschaft behavior 
but rather Gesellschaft behavior. Given the conditions in these two countries it is likely 
that they have good reasons to doubt the trustfulness of other farmers.  
 
The situation is more complex in Russia than in Macedonia as the Russian agricultural 
producers actually have cooperatives, established by the governmental administration. 
The fact that these cooperative were founded by governmental bodies and not by the 
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producers is crucial. The producers’ trust in government is strongly influenced by their 
experiences from the Soviet era, which is to say that the producers are due to have little 
sympathy for the top-down organized cooperatives. These firms are not considered to 
belong to the producers.  
 
On top of this, the heterogeneity among the Russian agricultural producers is extreme, so 
the prospects for trust, commitment and loyalty are minimal. The producers are members 
because they want to reap the benefits from governmental investments in the 
cooperatives, not because they believe in cooperative business – actually they have very 
little knowledge about cooperatives. Hence, one may conclude that the Russian 
agricultural producers have no Gemeinschaft relation to the cooperatives. The same is 
true for the Macedonian small dairy farmers. Under such conditions any future for 
cooperative business does not exist.  
 
The opposite condition holds true for the New Zealand dairy farmers. Being a member of 
Fonterra contributes to the self-identification for the dairy farmers. Contributing to this is 
the fact that the farmers might be in a vulnerable position if Fonterra were no longer 
controlled by the farmers. The cooperative tradition in New Zealand is so strong that the 
dairy farmers want to keep on owning and controlling Fonterra and deliver their milk to 
this cooperative.  
 
The situation in the largest Swedish cooperative in the farm supply and grain marketing 
industry is complex. On the one hand the members demand the best possible prices from 
their cooperative, i.e. a Gesellschaft attribute. On the other hand they also want the 
cooperative to be small and personal – a Gemeinschaft demand. The two requirements do 
not go hand in hand. This may be an outcome of the fact that the organization is split up 
into two – one member-business organization and the dominating profit-maximizing 
organization. The logics within these two parts are widely disparate so the members do 
not know which kind of organization their cooperative is.  
 
The cooperative has become so large and so diversified that the members have 
difficulties to identify themselves with it. It has expanded so much upstream and 
downstream that the members no longer understand the business activities. The 
international business activities are difficult for the member to apprehend.  
 
As many of the locally based silo plants were closed and the local retail outlets were 
closed the members felt that the cooperative had abandoned them. These operations 
constituted the heart of the business, according to the members. The members demand 
Gemeinschaft while they are acting according to Gesellschaft norms, i. e. demanding 
better prices. An explanation to this seemingly contradictory behavior is that they do not 
understand the complex structure of the cooperative organization. The members want 
decentralization but the business logics require centralized decision-making.  
 
The consequence of a complex structure of the cooperatives is also seen in the case of the 
forestry cooperative case. The forest owners might have the goal of getting as much as 
possible for their timber (Gesellschaft), but as they are bewildered by the complexities as 
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concerns pricing principles they resort to socially contingent behavior (Gemeinschaft). 
The members might want to behave according to Gesellschaft norms but due to the 
difficulties of doing so they rather behave according to Gemeinschaft.  
 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
Behavior of cooperative business and investor-owned firms differs. Homo Sociologicus 
features in the orientation of members may clash with the orientation of their business 
firm in a cooperative, whereas this interaction will most likely be different when the 
business firm is investor-owned. At first glance, cooperative members, being humans of 
flesh and blood, may seem to behave “irrationally’. However, cooperative members 
behaving according to Gemeinschaft norms may also be seen as rational in a Homo 
Oeconomicus sense. Belonging to a social group and being influenced by social 
relationships may be rational for the individual. Hence, it seems that Homo Sociologicus 
and Homo Oeconomicus are siblings. Like so often siblings often fight but still they tend 
to support one another.  
 
For this reason researchers when studying cooperatives should acknowledge the 
complexity that exists in cooperative businesses. The balance between Gemeinschaft 
(Wesenwille) and Gesellschaft (Kürwille) is hard to know beforehand, hence empirical 
studies are important. Therefore behavioral theories are valuable and so are empirical 
studies of the behavior of cooperative members and potential members.  
 
As concerns topics for research it must be stressed that cooperative organizational models 
must be prioritized. The discussion above indicates that there may be conflicts between 
the member organization, where Gemeinschaft is often prevailing, and the cooperative 
business firm where Gesellschaft is due to rule. Additionally, the researchers should 
understand the mechanism that Gesellschaft is expanding on the behalf of Gemeinschaft 
in cases where Gesellschaft organizations are successful. The present trend of large 
cooperatives having problems to maintain their Gemeinschaft attributes is indicative. On 
the other hand, new and small cooperatives are continuously being established, based on 
Gemeinschaft conditions.  
 
Researchers must find ways whereby the members’ quest for Gemeinschaft may be 
balanced with their Gesellschaft relationship to the co-operative (incentive alignment). 
Each cooperative organizational model implies different combinations of Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft (incentive structures). The issue of centralization versus decentralization 
of decision making is essential. Which effects do different governance structures have for 
the cooperative members? 
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